Allen W. Wood - Nature Quotes

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In Kantian ethics, the fundamental value is humanity or rational nature as an end in itself.

Allen W. Wood
I think Kantian ethics must [...] reject the unity of the person account. A more consistent Kantian approach is based on the idea that we can treat, or fail to treat, rational nature as an end in itself not only in the person of a rational being in the strict sense but also in the way we treat other beings who are not persons in the strict sense.

Allen W. Wood
Kant's view about freedom of the will, […] is one of the most unstable areas in his philosophy. It is a topic he frequently revisited, never saying quite the same thing he ever said before. Kant's theory of freedom, and especially the idea that we are free only in the intelligible world beyond nature, has also been the chief stumbling block to the acceptance of his moral philosophy. The scandal has only increased with the passage of time, as fewer and fewer moral philosophers find it tolerable to burden morality with an extravagant supernaturalist metaphysics.

Allen W. Wood
The standard or dominant conception of ethical theory has two main characteristics, the first having to do with moral epistemology, the second with the nature of moral principles–the demands made on them, and the way they are to be applied. [...] The dominant model takes intuitions about particular cases as the primary ground of appeal for the authority of moral principles. A moral judgment is not counted as an 'intuition' in this sense unless it is generally accepted and made after careful consideration. But even the best intuitions about particular examples are not regarded as infallible.

Allen W. Wood
There are two main reasons that Kant refuses to allow that sympathy or any other empirical sentiment or desire could constitute the foundation of morality. One is that no sentiment of this kind can yield the kinds of objective and universal principles that morality requires. They can approximate to this only by claiming a greater empirical uniformity in human nature than experience shows to be there. […] Kant's other main reason for rejecting sympathy or love as the basis of morality involves his view of the empirical psychology of these feelings as they arise in us in our social condition, and especially in the civilized condition of modern European society.

Allen W. Wood
Kantian ethics rests on a single fundamental value – the dignity or absolute worth of rational nature, as giving moral laws and as setting rational ends. The fundamentally valuable thing in the universe is a rational being, a person – or, more precisely, rational nature in a person. The demands made on us by this value depend on the kinds of conduct required to show respect for this value.

Allen W. Wood
Treating a being as an end in itself means respecting the value of what makes it such an end. After we see that this value resides in rational nature, we see it implies that, at least in general, rational beings should not be subjected to deception or coercion. Instead, we should seek to harmonize our strivings with those of other rational beings toward their ends.

Allen W. Wood